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Abstract
We revisit the analysis of the ASW contract signing protocol and use a uniﬁed view of the protocol
as a whole as a basis to reason about the protocol and its objectives. This line of reasoning
yields a simpler and clearer model of agents and protocol objectives which is within the scope
of standard security analysis methods, as it does not require fairness constraints and uses only
standard authentication and secrecy properties. We also analyse this model for ﬁnitely and inﬁnitely
many sessions of the protocol using the automated analysis tools OFMC and its extension OFMC-
FP.
Keywords: Contract Signing, Fair Exchange, Automated Protocol Analysis
1 Introduction
Contract signing protocols like the ASW protocol presented in [1] allow their
users to digitally sign contracts without having to meet and sign a document
or exchange it via standard mail, which can be very helpful in everyday com-
munication in the business world.
When considering the formal analysis of such protocols, the diﬃculty arises
that they are out of scope of many existing protocol analysis methods: al-
though the act of signing and exchanging messages is standard for these meth-
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ods, it is diﬃcult to integrate the objectives which contract signing protocols
aim to fulﬁl and the special assumptions upon which they rely.
We present a uniﬁed view of the ASW protocol in which the subprotocols
are seen as a single protocol with diﬀerent possible execution paths. While
this view is implicit in the protocol models built, for instance, in [5,14], we
explicitly describe and reason about the protocol and its objectives based on
this high level view, which yields a simpler, more intuitive understanding of
the ASW contract signing protocol.
In particular, our model is simpler than other approaches in two respects.
First, as a consequence of our view, one does not have to distinguish between
an intruder and dishonest and corrupt participants (or even diﬀerent degrees
of corruption), as it is necessary in several other models. Second, adopting this
view allows us to reason about the objectives of such a protocol in a simple
yet powerful way. We demonstrate, for instance, how several of the security
objectives identiﬁed by the designers of the protocol can in fact be expressed
as standard secrecy and authentication properties, thus “opening the door”
to a variety of existing automated protocol analysis tools.
We then apply our uniﬁed view concretely, constructing a model of the
ASW protocol and formally analysing it using the tools we have developed in
our group, the On-the-Fly Model-Checker OFMC and its abstraction-based
extension OFMC-FP. Both were developed in the context of the AVISPA
project (http://www.avispa-project.org), which oﬀers a toolset for the
automated analysis of security protocols and applications. Using OFMC, we
can verify the protocol for ﬁnitely many sessions (that is, executions of the
protocol). Beyond this, we also perform an analysis with OFMC-FP, verifying
the protocol for inﬁnitely many sessions.
In the analysis, the tools report an attack on the ASW protocol which
results from a subtlety in the speciﬁcation of the objectives. Adapting these,
we were able to verify that the protocol does ensure a slightly weaker objective
that still implies the main fair exchange objective.
We observe that, even given the simpler understanding of the protocol
that our approach aﬀords, the design of a formal model for automatic analysis
presents several challenges. After introducing these, we brieﬂy discuss the
results of our automated analysis for both ﬁnitely and inﬁnitely many protocol
sessions.
2 Background
The ASW protocol, presented by Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner in [1], is an
optimistic fair exchange protocol for contract signing intended to enable two
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Exchange subprotocol:
1. O → R : me1 = SigO(VO, VR, T, text, h(NO))
2. R → O : me2 = SigR(me1, h(NR))
3. O → R : NO
4. R → O : NR
Abort subprotocol:
1. O → T : ma1 = SigO(aborted,me1)
2. T → O : ma2 = if resolved(me1 ) then SigT (me1,me2)
else SigT (aborted,ma1) ; aborted(ma1 ) = true
Resolve subprotocol:
1. O → T : mr1 = me1,me2
2. T → O : mr2 = if aborted(me1 ) then SigT (aborted,me1)
else SigT (me1,me2) ; resolved(me1 ) = true
Fig. 1. The Subprotocols of ASW
parties to commit themselves to a previously agreed upon contractual text.
A trusted third party (T3P) is involved only if dispute resolution is required
(hence the term optimistic, which diﬀerentiates this approach from others
in which an online trusted party is involved in every exchange). In resolving
disputes, the T3P issues either a replacement contract asserting that he recog-
nises the contract in question as valid, or an abort token asserting that he has
never issued, and will never issue, a replacement contract. An important re-
quirement of the protocol is that the intruder cannot block messages between
an honest agent and the T3P forever.
2.1 Protocol Objectives
The objectives that such a protocol is supposed to fulﬁl are manifold. We
discuss here the security objectives identiﬁed by the designers and later refer
to these informal descriptions in the discussion of our veriﬁcation. Note that [1]
refers to “fairness” in the sense of “fair exchange,” but we adopt this latter
term to avoid confusion with the notion of fairness constraints as understood
by the model checking community, which we will use later.
Though [1] presents a framework for the fair exchange of arbitrary items,
we consider only the application of this framework to contract signing. We
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therefore describe the objectives that follow in a manner specialised to our
purposes.
1. First and perhaps foremost is the notion of fair exchange, which intu-
itively means that, at the end of a protocol execution, either both parties
possess valid contracts, or neither does. In particular, we require that if
one agent ends up with only an abort token, then the other cannot be in
possession of a valid contract.
2. Eﬀectiveness means that, if two honest agents P and Q have ﬁnished
the protocol and never chose to abandon the current protocol run, then
each indeed has a valid contract.
3. The protocol also provides guarantees of timely completion: more specif-
ically, the originator and responder of a protocol run can be sure of
completion within a ﬁnite amount of time.
4. The objective of non-repudiability, in the contract signing case, means
that the contract contains an implicit proof of the agents’ acceptance of
the contractual text.
5. Third party veriﬁability dictates that, if the trusted third party should
be corrupt and behave in such a way as to compromise fairness of the
exchange for one of the protocol participants, then this corrupt behaviour
can be proven to an external veriﬁer.
The requirements for fair exchange are often stated in terms of liveness
properties of the form “if one agent has a valid contract, then the other either
has one as well or is in the position to eventually obtain one.” In general,
liveness properties are problematic for a variety of veriﬁcation approaches, in
particular those involving inﬁnite state-spaces. In this case, one often approx-
imates liveness properties via safety properties, i.e. if the protocol satisﬁes the
safety property, then it also satisﬁes the liveness property that was approxi-
mated, as it is for instance done in [14]. In §3, we similarly identify appropriate
safety properties to check; as we will show, however, from our uniﬁed view of
the protocol we can directly obtain appropriate safety properties by a simple
meta-reasoning.
2.2 Explanation of the protocol
The protocol, shown in Fig. 1, consists of three subprotocols: exchange, abort,
and resolve. The former involves only the two protocol participants, the orig-
inator O and the responder R, while the latter two are only executed if the
trusted third party T is called upon to resolve a dispute. Our notational con-
ventions are as follows: SigO(M) denotes the digital signature of message M
by agent O, whose public key for signature veriﬁcation is VO. The contractual
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text we call text. During the protocol, each party generates a nonce, which
we write NO and NR for the originator and responder, respectively. Finally,
the function h is a cryptographic hash function which is assumed to be colli-
sion resistant. We note that the protocol deﬁnes two kinds of valid contracts:
either the standard contract as it is obtained by the exchange subprotocol, or
a replacement contract issued by the T3P, and both hold equal validity.
The Exchange Subprotocol: If both participants are honest and in the
absence of network failures or intruder intervention, after execution of the
exchange subprotocol, both will be in possession of a valid standard contract.
Both originator and responder generate nonces NO and NR which are
called their respective secret commitments to the contract. Given these, they
compute their so-called public commitments by hashing these values, yielding
h(NO) and h(NR), respectively. The protocol then proceeds in two rounds: in
the ﬁrst, each party expresses his public commitment to the agreed-upon con-
tract but does not disclose his secret commitment. In the second round, they
then exchange their respective secret commitments. Each party can then hash
this latter and thus verify that the purported secret commitment he receives
indeed corresponds to the public commitment from the ﬁrst protocol stage.
At the end of this exchange, each party is in possession of a valid standard
contract of the form me1,me2, NO, NR.
The Abort Subprotocol: If O does not receive R’s reply me2 within an
acceptable time frame (where the deﬁnition of “acceptable” is left entirely up
to O), he may abort the protocol by invoking the trusted third party. He sends
a signed abort request ma1 indicating that he wishes to abort the exchange.
The T3P is assumed to maintain a permanent database of contracts for
which he has been called upon to arbitrate. If he has already asserted the valid-
ity of the contract (indicated by resolved(me1)), then he sends the originator
a replacement contract of the form SigT (me1,me2). Otherwise, he replies with
a so-called abort token, signing the originator’s abort request and adding an
entry in his database of aborted contracts. Such a token does not render an
existing contract invalid, but rather serves merely as a promise from the T3P
that he has not previously resolved the contract in question and will not do
so in the future.
The Resolve Subprotocol: The resolve subprotocol is analogous to the
abort but can be invoked by either participant. The parties will request reso-
lution of a contract from the T3P if they do not receive the secret commitment
nonce of the other party within a reasonable amount of time. A resolution
request includes both messages from the ﬁrst stage of the exchange subpro-
tocol, me1 and me2. If the T3P has already issued an abort token for the
contract in question (indicated by aborted(me1)), he replies in kind with an
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exchange1. O → R : me1
if timeout then abort1. O → T : ma1
abort2. T → O : ma2 (abort token or replacement contract)
else
exchange2. R → O : me2
exchange3. O → R : NO
if timeout then resolve1. O → T : mr1
resolve2. T → O : mr2 (abort token or replacement contract)
else
exchange4. R → O : NR
Fig. 2. Originator role under our uniﬁed view of the protocol.
abort token. Otherwise, he issues a replacement contract and indicates in his
database that he has resolved the contract.
2.3 The Intruder Model
We adopt the standard intruder model of Dolev and Yao [8] in which the
intruder has complete control over the network but cannot break cryptography.
In addition, the intruder can play as a normal protocol participant, acting as
either the originator or the responder, but not as the T3P.
As we will discuss in more detail in §3, such an intruder model already
subsumes the possibility of compromised or dishonest agents that collaborate
with the intruder, and we want to show that the interests of honest agents are
always ensured, even in protocol runs with the intruder.
3 The Uniﬁed View
The key idea behind this paper is to view, and reason about, ASW’s subpro-
tocols not in isolation, but rather as one protocol. This view is implicit in the
construction of the protocol and accordingly also in the models of the protocol
built by [5,14]. We explicitly exploit this view to reason about properties of
the protocol. More speciﬁcally, we consider the abort and resolve subprotocols
to be part of the main exchange protocol. The originator role, for instance,
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Sent initial message to responder
Received reply from responder
Sent own nonce to responder
Possess valid standard contract Resolved by trusted third party
Asked trusted third party for resolve
Asked trusted third party for abort
Aborted
resolve1. O → T : mr1
timeout
abort1. O → T : ma1
timeout
exchange3. O → R: NO
exchange2. R → O: ma2
Reply from responder
Reply from responder
exchange1. O → R: me1
T → O: resolve token T → O: abort token
exchange4. O → R: NR
Fig. 3. A state transition view of the originator role. The dashed line represents a transition that
can never occur if the trusted server is honest, as we will show below as part of our analysis.
looks then as shown in Fig. 2 (the responder role is similar), where timeout
represents the event that the agent playing O did not receive a reply to his
last message within a reasonable amount of time. We avoid specifying the
concrete amount of time after which the timeout shall occur: it may be just a
few seconds or a full hour—important for the security of the protocol is only
that there is such a timeout, so the agent will not wait for an answer forever.
Fig. 3 illustrates the internal states of an agent playing the originator role:
after sending his initial message, he is in the state in which he waits for a reply
until the timeout. If the timeout occurs, then he tries to abort the protocol
and thus waits for the answer of the trusted third party (which can be either
a replacement contract or the signed abort token). Otherwise (if he receives
a reply in time), he carries on with the regular protocol execution and sends
his nonce, arriving in a state similar to the one he was in after sending the
ﬁrst message: either there is a reply within the allotted time or he contacts
the trusted third party.
This model, though abstract, is thus a faithful representation of a real
implementation of the protocol, as agents indeed protect themselves with such
internal timeouts. Note that this is related to the possibility of abuse in this
contract signing protocol: when the originator has made the ﬁrst step, the
responder has the freedom to either accept the contract by sending the second
message, or to reject it by ignoring it. In particular, a dishonest responder
could abuse the originator-signed part of the contract in negotiations with
other agents (for instance, by soliciting more advantageous contracts from
competitors). Note that, unlike for instance the similar GJM [9] protocol, the
ASW protocol has no means to prevent this abuse by special cryptographic
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primitives such as private contract signatures. Thus, the timeout is the only
way to narrow the window of the originator’s vulnerability to abuse attacks
as argued in [6].
Although we assume that the intruder can control the entire network ac-
cording to the Dolev-Yao model, the protocol requires that he cannot block
messages between an honest agent and the T3P forever. One could intuitively
imagine this situation as follows: all network connections could crash, but an
honest agent can still transmit the necessary messages over other media (e.g.
ordinary mail) to the T3P and this process cannot take forever.
One could say that we thus have two kinds of fairness assumptions: ﬁrst,
an honest agent will not wait forever for an answer from the other party,
and second, the “emergency” protocols with the T3P will eventually succeed.
Looking once again at Fig. 3, we can interpret this combination of fairness
constraints as the guarantee that an honest agent playing the originator role
(and a similar guarantee holds for the responder role) will not stay forever in
any of the intermediate states (the states of the ﬁgure with an outgoing arrow),
but will eventually reach one of the three ﬁnal states, (i) where he received
the responder’s nonce 4 and thus now possesses a valid standard contract, (ii)
where he received a valid replacement contract from the trusted third party,
or (iii) where he received an abort token.
Thus, the two fairness constraints (timeout and guaranteed reply from the
T3P) are suﬃcient to conclude that every honest agent playing either the
originator or the responder role will eventually end up with either a valid
(standard or replacement) contract or an abort token. Roughly speaking, if
the agent receives a valid contract, then his interests are ensured, but if he
receives an abort token, then it remains to show that nobody else can obtain
a valid contract.
This gives us a fresh view on the protocol, as with a simple meta-argumen-
tation we can now go from a model with fairness constraints to a state-
reachability property in an inﬁnite state transition system without fairness
constraints.
The idea is essentially that we need only to check that if an honest agent
reaches his ﬁnal state of the protocol execution, then the guarantees he should
obtain through the protocol are indeed satisﬁed. In other words, we do not
need to consider the guarantees of agents in their intermediate states, since
they will eventually reach their ﬁnal state and we thus spare ourselves any
considerations of the form “if the agent can eventually reach a certain state”
4 If the responder sends a secret commitment that, when hashed, does not correspond with
the public commitment, then this is treated as if he had not sent any message at all (which
will probably result in a timeout).
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in the properties we check.
The encoding of the objectives as safety properties is the basis for the
deployment of automatic and semi-automatic methods for inﬁnite-state anal-
ysis. Also in ﬁnite-state analysis, the restriction to safety properties is often
essential, e.g. [14] use a similar argumentation that checking the protocol with
fairness conditions can be reduced to checking properties of “terminal states”
of agents.
4 Encoding of the Objectives
We now want to contrast two models: on the one hand, the model with the
fairness constraints described above (i.e. that the agent will eventually get the
timeout and the reply from the trusted third party), and on the other hand a
model without fairness constraints.
In the model without fairness, the state transitions of the honest agents
as shown in Fig. 3 are interpreted as follows: there is no timeout and no
guaranteed replies, thus an agent can remain in any intermediate state forever.
An agent’s local state transition system is thus non-deterministic, as in the
states where an honest agent waits for the reply of the other party, he can
at any time (i.e. without timeout) begin the abort or resolve protocol, as
appropriate.
It follows immediately that, if there is a violation of a safety property in
the model with fairness, then there is also a violation in the model without
fairness. This shows that our approach is sound in the sense that if we can
prove properties in the model without fairness constraints, then they must
also hold in the model with fairness constraints. The challenge is to ﬁnd
appropriate safety properties that indeed hold without the fairness constraints
and that imply the safety and liveness properties of §2.1 that we wish to check.
We now review the objectives laid out in §2.1 under the new view of the
protocol and show how to encode those objectives that we wish to check as
safety properties.
Let us begin with objective (3.), timely completion, which means that an
honest agent will always eventually reach a valid standard or replacement
contract or an abort token. This objective is a direct consequence of the
model with fairness constraints, as discussed, and thus does not need to be
explicitly checked.
Objective (1.), fair exchange, is the main objective of the protocol, namely
that either both parties obtain a contract or neither does. We decompose this
objective into the following two:
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1a. If an honest agent receives an abort token, then nobody (except the
trusted third party) can ever obtain a valid standard or replacement
contract.
1b. If an agent A (who is not necessarily honest) has obtained a valid
standard or replacement contract signed by an honest agent B, then
B also possess a valid contract or can obtain one from the trusted
third party.
Objective (1a.) is the main objective of our analysis, as it reﬂects the basic
guarantee linked with the abort token. The nice aspect of this objective is
that it refers to the ﬁnal state of an honest agent (which will not subsequently
change), not to an intermediate state. It is thus possible to check in the model
without fairness that in all states where an agent has reached a ﬁnal state
with an abort token, nobody except the T3P can generate a valid standard
or replacement contract matching that abort token. The inability to generate
these messages can be expressed in standard protocol analysis approaches by
secrecy properties. We can thus reduce the main objective of the protocol to
a standard property in protocol analysis (though there is a technical diﬃculty
in the direct application of tools as we will discuss below).
Objective (1b.) is a consequence of objectives (1a.) and (3.): if an agent
A possesses a valid contract signed by an honest agent B, then by (3.) B will
also eventually reach either an abort token or a valid contract, and by (1a.),
if he gets an abort token, then A cannot possess a valid contract, which is a
contradiction. Thus B will eventually obtain a valid contract.
Note that the circumstance in which the intruder or a dishonest agent
playing the role of the originator can obtain both a valid contract and an
abort token (by performing a normal run with an honest agent and asking the
T3P for an abort) is not a violation of the objectives above: the abort token
only guarantees that the T3P has never and will never resolve this contract
but does not render an existing contract invalid.
We now turn to the objective (2.), eﬀectiveness. In the view of our model,
where every honest agent will eventually reach a ﬁnal state, eﬀectiveness means
that when an honest agent A receives an abort token for a session with an
honest agent B, then A or B must have chosen to abort the contract. Since the
abort token from the T3P contains the signature of the agent A or B according
to the protocol, it contains the implicit proof that either A or B indeed wants
to abort the protocol run. Eﬀectiveness is thus an implicit guarantee due to
the form of the abort token, and will therefore not be considered in the later
analysis.
Objective (4.), non-repudiability, can also be seen as a consequence of
the message formats, since in a valid standard or replacement contract, the
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signatures of both parties are contained and we can thus assume that they
agree with the contract text. However, we are also interested in a further
analysis, namely an analysis of the authentication properties (or agreement
properties in [10]) of ASW. Our analysis will include checks for replay and for
confusions of nonces. Such standard authentication properties do not rely on
fairness and are thus straightforward to check.
Finally, objective (5.), third-party veriﬁability, is not relevant in our setting,
as we assume that the T3P is always honest.
To summarise, we have showed that several objectives of the protocol are
direct consequences of its structure, assumptions, and message formats. In
essence, an honest agent will receive either an abort token or a valid contract.
In the latter case, his interests are ensured, while it remains to show that
in the case of an abort token, his interests are also ensured. This amounts
to checking that, if an honest agent obtains an abort token, then the valid
contract remains secret. Thus due to our view and the meta-reasoning about
the protocol we have obtained a model that falls within the realm of standard
automated protocol analysis approaches (which often support only secrecy and
authentication properties), and we have avoided fairness issues completely. As
we will see in the following section, the analysis even of this simpliﬁed model
is challenging.
Let us conclude this section with a remark on the intruder model. Several
approaches distinguish between the intruder and dishonest or corrupted agents
(with various degrees of corruption). One of the reasons for this distinction is
that the security properties of a protocol usually only hold for sessions between
honest agents. In particular, the intruder can play, under his real name, the
role of the initiator or the responder in a session with an honest agent; in such
a session no security properties are ensured for this honest agent, while this
session should not jeopardise the security of other sessions between honest
agents.
Due to our simpliﬁed view, the main security property that we have to
check for ASW, namely (1a.) that the secrecy of the valid contract once an
honest agent has received an abort token, should also hold in the case that the
other agent is dishonest. (But it is not necessarily ensured that this dishonest
agent also has the same security guarantee.) This means that we need not
distinguish between various kinds of corruption of dishonest agents.
5 Results
In the previous section, we have developed a uniﬁed view of the ASW protocol
and a formulation of safety properties. We now apply these ideas concretely,
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formally specifying and then automatically analysing the protocol using two
tools that we have developed in our group.
The ﬁrst tool is the On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC) which is based on
a symbolic representation of the intruder, called the lazy intruder [4]. For ter-
mination, it requires a bound on the number of sessions that can be performed,
but does not require other restrictions, e.g. on the complexity of messages.
This is similar to the ﬁnite-state analysis of [14].
The second tool OFMC-FP is an extension of OFMC with an abstract
ﬁxed-point computation of the reachable states when there is no bound on
the number of protocol runs that can be executed, however the complexity
of messages is bounded in this method. OFMC-FP is still in a preliminary
state at the time of writing: in particular, the user must manually design the
employed abstractions.
Both OFMC and OFMC-FP were developed in the context of the AVISPA
project and are based on the speciﬁcation languages developed in this project.
The user speciﬁes protocols using the High-Level Protocol Speciﬁcation Lan-
guage (HLPSL [2]); these speciﬁcations are then automatically translated into
the low-level Intermediate Format (IF [3]) which is the input language for au-
tomated analysis tools. The ﬁrst task is thus to specify our view of the ASW
protocol in HLPSL.
5.1 Speciﬁcation
The construction of a formal model of ASW presents three major challenges:
Firstly, an aspect of the protocol that is diﬃcult to model is the database
of aborted and resolved contracts maintained by the T3P. Many existing pro-
tocol speciﬁcation languages cannot express this, however HLPSL and IF in-
clude the necessary constructs (i.e. ﬁnite sets of messages) to model such a
database. Moreover, the database cannot be integrated directly in inﬁnite
state veriﬁcation approaches that use abstraction.
Secondly, when using OFMC, we bound the number of sessions of the
honest agents to obtain a ﬁnite state-space. However, there is no a priori
bound on the number of steps that the T3P can perform: in particular, the
intruder can exchange an unbounded number of messages with the T3P. In
the ﬁnite-session analysis with OFMC, we therefore also bound the number
of requests from the intruder that the T3P can process.
Finally, although we have reduced the main problem of our analysis to a
secrecy question, a further subtlety arises. When an abort token containing
an initial message me1 is issued, we must check for the secrecy of any valid
contract that contains me1. We thus do not state the secrecy of only one par-
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e1. I → R : me1
e2. R → I : me2
e3. I → R : NI
e4. R → I : NR
e1
′. I → R : me1
e2
′. R → I : me2′
Intruder stops communication
a1. I → T : ma1
a2. T → I : abort token
r1. R → T : {me1,me2′}
r2. T → R : abort token
Fig. 4. An attack returned by OFMC: The intruder (denoted as I) aborts a contract that has
already been exchanged. In a subsequent run with the same responder, the responder is then
unable to resolve the protocol.
ticular message, but of a pattern of messages. Such a feature is currently not
supported by HLPSL and IF (or most other protocol speciﬁcation languages).
As a simple way around the problem we specify an honest agent that acts as
an observer and ﬂags an error state appropriately.
5.2 Bounded-session Analysis with OFMC
Bounding the number of sessions and the number of requests from the intruder
that the T3P processes, we can now directly check whether the transition of
the referee ever ﬁres, as well as check authentication properties.
OFMC discovers several authentication problems that were already iden-
tiﬁed in [14]. First, the protocol does not provide strong authentication (in-
jective agreement as deﬁned by Lowe in [10]), as it has no explicit protection
against replay: if the intruder listens to a session of two honest agents, he
can replay the exchange protocol with the responder any number of times
and obtain valid contracts, each with a fresh responder nonce. However, we
think one should assume an implicit replay-protection as part of the con-
tract, e.g. transactions are usually identiﬁed by unique transaction numbers.
In this scenario, we thus check that the protocol provides weak authentica-
tion (also called non-injective agreement, [10]). Weak authentication with
respect to the contractual text and the nonces N0 and NR is also violated,
and OFMC returns an attack trace resulting from the same authentication
problems reported in [14]. Finally, weak authentication with respect to only
the contractual text is veriﬁed by OFMC for various ﬁnite test scenarios.
When turning to the secrecy properties we have formulated, OFMC re-
ported the attack displayed in Fig. 4. Assume the intruder I acting as the
protocol originator and an honest responder R have completed a run of the
exchange subprotocol without involving the T3P (steps e1 through e4). Each
generated a secret commitment (NI and NR, respectively) and ends up with
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a valid contract in the standard form. Assume now that the intruder issues
an abort request for this same contract to the T3P. This latter, having never
before resolved the contract in question, will respond with a valid abort token.
The intruder now starts a second session with R, replaying the ﬁrst message
me1 from the previous session. R generates a new nonce NR
′ and replies in
good faith with the second message me2
′, including the hash of this new nonce.
The intruder, however, does not reply with his nonce but rather ignores R.
In turn, R will time out and request resolution of the contract from the T3P,
who will respond with an abort token, since the originator message me1 in
question has already been aborted by I. Upon completion of the second pro-
tocol session, R therefore has an abort token, while I has a valid contract
that corresponds to this abort token (in the sense that it contains the same
initial message me1). Of course, R himself also possesses this contract, having
exchanged it with I in the ﬁrst protocol session.
Formally this violates the objective (1a.): an honest agent has an abort
token, while somebody else (the intruder) has a valid contract. It is not
really a problem, since the honest agent itself also has this valid contract.
In particular, the original objective (1.) is not violated, since both agents
indeed possess valid contracts for the same contractual text. This is somewhat
surprising, as we now see that there can be situations in which an honest
agent indeed possesses both a valid contract and an abort token. Note that
objective (1a.) is also considered by [14], who reported problems in the relation
of nonces and contracts but did not detect that (1a.) can be violated. The
same authors report in [13] an analogous attack on GJM, a similar contract
signing protocol [9]. We note also that the improvement of the protocol that
they suggest to address the authentication problems described above does not
prevent this situation.
We have therefore relaxed objective (1a.) to the following weaker objective
(1a′.): “if an honest agent has an abort token, then he also possesses a valid
contract or nobody else can obtain one.” Note that this property together
with (1b.) still implies fair exchange (1.). For this weakened objective, OFMC
detected no further attacks.
We also wish to note that an additional check on the responder side for
replay of public commitments would prevent this attack.
5.3 Unbounded-session Analysis with OFMC-FP
We have also analysed the protocol using OFMC-FP, which employs a novel
abstraction-based ﬁxed-point computation. It was necessary to extend the
existing OFMC-FP technique to allow for the integration of the server and its
database of contracts. The technique is not completely automatic as the user
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must himself specify an appropriate abstraction.
OFMC-FP can also detect attacks, but due to the abstraction they may
not be possible in our initial concrete model; however, if the security is proven
for the abstract model, then this also holds for the concrete model. This is
similar to other abstraction-based veriﬁcation approaches like [7].
Using the OFMC-FP technique, we have established the veriﬁcation results
of OFMC for an unbounded number of participants, sessions, and transitions
of the T3P; only the complexity of messages is bounded in this method. In
particular, we have ﬁrst shown that weak authentication on only the contrac-
tual text holds. Further, OFMC-FP reveals that a dishonest initiator can
obtain a valid standard contract which has also been aborted by the server,
which subsumes the violation of (1a.) already reported above. Also, we es-
tablished that in all such situations, the other party also obtained a valid
standard contract and thus veriﬁed the weakened property (1a′.). We note,
however, that as part of the analysis, we have found that, for property (1a′.)
to hold, an important prerequisite is the fact that an honest agent playing in
the originator role can never obtain an abort token from the T3P as a reply
to a resolve request, explaining the dashed line in Fig. 3.
6 Related Work and Conclusion
A substantial body of literature exists on the analysis of contract signing
protocols, in particular ASW and the similar GJM protocol.
Shmatikov and Mitchell undertake an analysis (with a bounded number
of sessions) of both the ASW and the GJM protocol using the ﬁnite-state
model-checker Murϕ [12,13,14]. Their approach is closest to ours, namely
they also follow the principal idea to reduce the problem of fairness properties
to safety properties. While they also implicitly employ the uniﬁed view of the
protocol, they do not use it explicitly to perform meta-reasoning about the
protocol. Another diﬀerence is that they also distinguish the intruder from
dishonest agents (with varying degrees of corruption). Moreover, they check
abuse-freeness for the GJM protocol (while ASW is not designed to ensure
abuse-freeness).
Das and Dill [7] were the ﬁrst to describe the automated analysis of a
contract signing protocol, GJM, for an unbounded number of session using
abstractions and the model-checker Murϕ. Similar to our analysis, they focus
on the property of fair exchange.
Kremer and Raskin [11] focus on abuse-freeness and argue that, under cer-
tain assumptions, even the ASW protocol is abuse free (while this was not one
of the original objectives of the protocol designers). To appropriately model
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strategies of malicious agents and strategic advantages over other agents, they
use a game theoretic method and alternating transition systems. They per-
form an automated analysis using the model-checker Mocha; note that they
do not consider multiple runs of the protocol in parallel and adopt the strong
typing assumption. 5
There are several works (which do not focus on automated analysis) on
reasoning about such protocols and their guarantees, in particular optimism
and fairness [5,6]. The employed models are considerably more detailed than
ours in that they explicitly use time-outs and distinguish intruder and (dif-
ferent kinds of) dishonest agents. Also, here a similar view to ours is often
taken, though to our knowledge not been used to reason about the protocol
and its objectives.
We adopt this uniﬁed view and use it explicitly to reason about the proto-
col’s objectives and thereby reduce several of them to standard authentication
and secrecy properties which are easily digestible by many automated analysis
tools for which protocols like ASW would previously have been out of scope.
Yet, as described in §5.1, even under the uniﬁed view, the speciﬁcation and
analysis with existing protocol analysis tools is challenging, in particular this
holds for the modelling of the trusted third party that maintains a data-base
of aborted and resolved contracts.
Our analysis demonstrated the same authentication failures discussed in
[14] and also revealed that a guarantee that one might intuitively expect of
the protocol, objective (1a.), is in fact violated by the attack we present. We
can, however, show that, beyond these problems, the protocol is secure.
While we have focused on ASW in our work to date, we are optimistic that
the beneﬁts oﬀered by the adoption of such a uniﬁed view will be applicable to
similar protocols as well. In general, the meta-reasoning we perform regarding
security objectives can help not only to better understand the objectives of
a given protocol, but, as we have seen, can also identify potential ways in
which seemingly complicated objectives can be reduced to more standard no-
tions such as authentication and secrecy. In this way, we hope to extend the
applicability of existing methods for the formal analysis of security protocols.
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